

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

TS 771501  
SP - 1/77  
14 January 1977  
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy to the DCI for National Intelligence  
National Intelligence Officer for USSR  
Acting Director, Center for Policy Support, DDI

FROM: National Intelligence Officer for Strategic Programs

SUBJECT: Material for Vice President-elect on Strategic Threat

1. Yesterday Dave Aaron's office requested materials to assist Senator Mondale in preparing for his forthcoming overseas trip. Requested were (a) talking points on the strategic threat and (b) background on the A-B Team exercise. Attached are draft responses, with added background on strategic threat. Both these background papers are based almost entirely on recent DCI NSC briefing notes and notes for Congressional testimony. A background paper on recently-completed NIE 11-4 is also included, drawn from NSC briefing notes.

2. Deadline for delivery to Aaron's office is C.O.B. today, 14 January. Comments/concurrence required no later than 1400 today.

[Redacted Signature Box]

Howard Stoertz, Jr.

Attachments

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SUBJECT: Material for Vice President-elect on Strategic Threat

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BACKGROUND PAPER

US INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT  
SOVIET FORCES FOR INTERCONTINENTAL CONFLICT  
THROUGH THE MID 1980s

1. The Soviets are continuing to press forward with a broad and vigorous program for improving their capabilities for intercontinental conflict. Soviet programs during the past decade have enabled the USSR to surpass the US in a growing number of quantitative measures of strategic forces, although the United States maintains some quantitative and many qualitative advantages. (See comparative graphs.)






Offensive Forces

2. The Soviets continue their efforts to improve existing weapons and to acquire more powerful, flexible, and survivable weapons systems. During the next ten years, the Soviet ICBM forces will continue to constitute the bulk of Soviet strategic striking power. They currently have some 1,360 operational ICBMs.
  - a. New ICBMs are being deployed at a moderate pace. Most of these new missiles carry MIRVs and about 200 silos for them are now operational. We project that by mid-1980 there will be some 900 operational silos for this

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# Historical Trends in Selected Aspects of Strategic Forces



\* Excludes ICBM silo launchers under construction or conversion and SLBM launchers on SSBNs undergoing sea trials, conversion, or shipyard overhaul. Missile payloads composed of MRVs (which are not independently targetable) are counted as one RV.

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new generation of ICBMs, in addition to newer variants of an existing system.

- b. The new generation missiles have better accuracy, greater throw weights, and are more survivable than their predecessors.
- c. In addition to the ICBMs being deployed, we have identified [ ] ICBM-related development programs [ ]


- d. A mobile ICBM system has been developed, but deployment has evidently been deferred. [ ]

3. The ballistic missile submarine force also continues to grow in size and overall strike capability. The next ten years should see further qualitative and quantitative improvements.

- a. A total of about 60 modern ballistic missile submarines with some 850 launch tubes are currently operational or on sea trials.
- b. Several units of a new version of the latest class of Soviet ballistic missile submarine have been

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# **Impact of Silo Conversion and Modernization Programs on Soviet ICBM Forces**



As the newer systems enter the force and the older systems are phased out, the total number of operational ICBMs will decline slightly because the SS-7s and SS-8s are not being replaced. Throughout this process, a small proportion of the silos will be temporarily out of service while they are being reworked or converted. We expect the Soviets to complete the deployment of the newer systems by the end of 1980, but we believe that about 10 to 15 percent of the force will continue to be off line in preparation for future systems developed in the interim.

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launched. These submarines will carry the first Soviet submarine ballistic missile to be equipped with MIRVs.

- c. A new and larger ballistic missile submarine, similar to our Trident, may now be under construction. If so, it could be operational by about 1980.
  - d. Two new types of submarine-launched missiles -- one equipped with MIRVs -- are being tested. There are indications that a third new missile is under development and could be for the new generation submarine.
4. Despite the emphasis on ballistic missiles, the Soviets probably will maintain a small intercontinental bomber force.
- a. There is additional evidence this year pointing to Soviet development of a new long-range bomber and a new tanker aircraft.
  - b. The Backfire bomber continues to be deployed. The Intelligence Community agrees that the Backfire is well suited for operations in Europe and Asia, but there continue to be uncertainties and differences of view about its capabilities for intercontinental attack and Soviet intentions to employ it in that role. (See graphic.)




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
# Assessments of BACKFIRE'S Capability Against the United States\*

## Unrefueled Mission

CIA Assessment




DIA, Army, Air Force Assessment




## Refueled Mission

CIA Assessment



DIA, Army, Air Force Assessment



\*A high-altitude, subsonic profile is used and the distances shown are for a payload of bombs. (See Table II of Volume II)

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5. The graphics below compare current and future US and Soviet offensive forces based on commonly used static measures. US programed offensive forces in the early and mid-1980s are compared with our best estimate (Best-SAL) and high estimate (High-SAL) of Soviet forces, assuming a new arms agreement based on the Vladivostok understanding. Also shown on the graphic are two projections of Soviet forces without a new SAL agreement: a moderate (Mod-No SAL) and a high (High-No SAL) projection. Both of the high projections, with and without a SAL agreement, assumed the highest level of Soviet effort we believe plausible and we judge them highly unlikely of attainment.
  - a. In the early 1980s, the number of Soviet ICBM and SLBM reentry vehicles will probably approximate, and possibly exceed, that of the US. Combining missile and bomber weapons, however, US forces will continue to possess a larger total number. In missile throw weight and equivalent megatonnage, the Soviets will continue to have the advantage.
  - b. After the early 1980s, the power of Soviet offensive forces will continue to increase. However, if US

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forces develop as now programed and Soviet forces continue to develop along present lines, some of the earlier Soviet gains in missile RVs and in total missile and bomber weapons will be eroded. The Soviets will still have the advantage in missile throw weight and in equivalent megatonnage.

- c. In the early 1980s, because of better accuracy, Soviet ICBMs will pose an increased threat to US missile silos. A major threat could emerge as early as the next two years if Soviet ICBM capabilities are at the most threatening extremes of our ranges of uncertainty.
  - d. Because of their hardening program, however, Soviet silo-based ICBMs will not be much more vulnerable in the early 1980s than they are presently. By the mid-1980s, the Soviets could judge that their own ICBM silos had become very vulnerable.
6. We see no compelling military reasons that would cause the Soviets to develop and deploy long-range cruise missile systems in the present strategic environment.
- a. The US has the technological advantage in such systems. If the Soviets cannot prevent US deployment of such systems through SALT, however, they may follow suit.

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- b. They could modify any of several existing air- and sea-launched cruise missiles for long-range use.
- c. They could develop new cruise missile systems using currently available technologies suitable for long-range use by the end of the 1970s, but small, long-range cruise missiles with sufficient accuracy to destroy hardened targets could not be operational before the mid-1980s.

#### Defensive Forces

- 7. As they strive to improve their offensive capabilities, the Soviets are pressing ahead with improvements to their strategic defenses. Among these are programs to enhance warning of ballistic missile attack and to develop ABM systems.
  - a. Large new radars under construction in the northwestern USSR will improve and extend Soviet ballistic missile early warning capabilities when they become operational in about 1979. There is disagreement in the community about whether these radars will be given the capability for ABM battle management.
  - b. The Soviets are continuing their research and development work on conventional ABM systems, probably as a hedge against uncertainties about the future. It is extremely unlikely that the Soviets now plan any ABM deployment beyond Moscow.

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8. The Soviets are also attempting to remedy the current deficiencies in their low-altitude air defense. (See two graphics) Current programs include the introduction of new data handling systems and an improved fighter into strategic air defense forces.
  - a. A new low-altitude SAM, new air defense radars, and a new fighter are under development. Deployment of these latter systems could begin in about 1980.
  - b. By the mid-1980s improvements in Soviet air defenses probably will make bomber penetration of the USSR considerably more difficult than it is today. We believe the Soviets will not have an effective defense against US short-range attack missiles (SRAMs) by the mid-1980s. We are uncertain about the degree of protection they could achieve against low-altitude cruise missiles but we believe it would be low.
  - c. Soviet air defense problems will be complicated further by advanced US bombers and cruise missiles. US penetration tactics and the effects of missile attacks will continue to weigh heavily against the overall effectiveness of Soviet air defenses, but we cannot assess these and other operational factors.
9. Soviet antisubmarine warfare forces are improving, but we believe they have little potential for overcoming the

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problems of detecting and tracking submarines in broad ocean areas.

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10. Soviet civil defense preparations could have a significant impact on both Soviet and US assessments of the likely outcome of a nuclear conflict.
  - a. The Soviet program in the last few years has been more extensive and better developed than we had understood until this year. Its priorities are evidently:
    - First, protection of the leadership,
    - Second, continuity of economic functions by dispersal and hardening and by protecting essential workers,
    - Third, protection of general population, largely by evacuating cities.
  - b. There are important gaps in our understanding of Soviet civil defense. Our tentative assessment of its present effectiveness is:
    - Under optimum conditions, including a period of warning in which the Soviets implemented advanced preparations including evacuated cities,

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a large percentage of the leadership would survive, urban casualties would be substantially reduced and the Soviets would have a good chance to sustain survivors.

-- With minimal warning, some key leaders would survive, urban casualties would be high and the Soviets would have a poor chance to sustain survivors.

c. The Soviets probably believe that civil defense measures contribute to giving the USSR a chance to survive as a national entity and to be in a better position than the US after a nuclear exchange.

-- The Soviets, however, probably do not have a highly optimistic view about the effectiveness of their present civil defenses.

-- Even under the most favorable conditions, they probably would expect a breakdown of the economy, and, under the worst conditions, catastrophic human casualties as well.

11. Our evidence of Soviet civil defense preparations indicates a continuing, steady program rather than a crash effort.

-- There are gaps in our knowledge, however, which we are now working to overcome.

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- We cannot make a confident estimate of the pace and future effectiveness of Soviet civil defense programs.
- a. In the view of DIA and the intelligence chiefs of the military services, the Soviets see their civil and passive defense program as an essential element in the achievement of the capability to wage inter-continental nuclear war, and believe that this program will have a definite and increasing impact on US-USSR strategic balance in the years ahead.
  - b. The intelligence chief of the Air Force further believes that the strategic balance already has been altered in a major way by civil defense and other Soviet measures.
  - c. The intelligence chief of the Department of State, on the other hand, believes the programs is a prudent hedge against the possibility of nuclear attack, and will not materially increase Soviet willingness to risk a nuclear exchange.
12. Some of the Soviets' present programs reflect concerns that US programs would affect their own strategic position adversely. Examples are ICBM silo hardening and the deployment of long-range SLBMs. We are uncertain about the implications of others. The mobile IRBM

and ICBM programs, for example, would enable the Soviets to place more of their missiles on launchers less vulnerable to attack. By their continuing efforts to improve ABM technology, the Soviets could put themselves in a position to deploy additional ABM defenses if the ABM Treaty were abrogated. Such programs probably represent Soviet hedges against future US threats as well as deterrents to US withdrawal from strategic arms limitation agreements. They could also represent efforts to give the Soviet leaders the future option to break out of such limitations if they concluded that the situation warranted.

Advanced Technologies

13. We are continuing to examine closely Soviet research and development programs which might erode US deterrent capabilities. They are conducting R&D on laser weapons and basic research in technologies related to other concepts of directed energy weapons for strategic defense.
  - a. The available evidence as well as the technical and operational problems involved lead all but the Air Force to rate as small the chances that the Soviets can sharply alter the strategic balance through such technological advances within the next ten years.

- b. The Air Force believes that the Soviets are significantly ahead of the West in technologies applicable to particle-beam weapons research and that they could have a prototype of such a system by 1985.
- c. All agencies agree that Soviet R&D in advanced technologies merits very close watching.

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Future Strategic Environment

14. Our broad conclusions about the strategic environment over the next 10 years are:
- a. The strength of Soviet offensive forces for inter-continental attack will continue to increase. It may be at its greatest relative to US programed forces in the early 1980s. In subsequent years, some of the earlier Soviet gains will be eroded, assuming that US forces develop as now programed and Soviet forces continue to develop along present lines.
  - b. Soviet ICBMs will pose an increasing threat to US missile silos, but Soviet forces will almost certainly remain unable to prevent most US alert bombers and SLBMs at sea from being launched. Soviet defenses will almost certainly remain penetrable by missile and bomber weapons.
  - c. Soviet forces will be able to inflict massive damage on the US in either initial or retaliatory attacks. It is extremely unlikely that Soviet forces will be able to prevent massive damage to the USSR from initial or retaliatory US attacks.
  - d. There are important uncertainties, however, about the pace and future effectiveness of the Soviet passive defense program, and about the future effectiveness of Soviet air defenses in actual wartime environment.

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- e. We cannot now assess the degree to which the Soviets in the 1980s might be able to reduce human casualties and limit damage to those functions and facilities which the leadership may consider essential to the survival of their society.

Objectives for Strategic Forces

- 15. The main trends in Soviet programs, and their pace, are about the same as described in last year's estimate, except that Soviet civil defenses are better developed than we previously understood. To the extent that this year's estimate presents a starker appreciation of Soviet strategic capabilities and objectives, it is but the latest of a series of estimates that have done so as evidence has accumulated on the continuing persistence and vigor of Soviet strategic programs. The cumulative effect of these programs has introduced more uncertainty and disagreement in the NIE than there was last year about the underlying Soviet perceptions and motives.
- 16. The main text of the estimate, which is the position of the DCI, reaches the following judgments about the Soviet leaders' objectives and expectations for their strategic nuclear forces:
  - a. The growth of Soviet capabilities for intercontinental conflict over the past decade has given

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the USSR a powerful deterrent and has contributed to its recognition as a superpower equal to the US.

- b. Many of the Soviet programs we are now observing can be attributed to a combination of defensive prudence, superpower competitiveness, worst-case assumptions about US capabilities, and a military doctrine that stresses war-fighting capabilities. But the continuing persistence and vigor of these programs give rise to the question of whether the Soviet leaders now hold as an operative, practical objective the achievement of clear strategic superiority over the US.
- c. Soviet expectations clearly reach well beyond a capability that serves merely as a deterrent to all-out attack. They see their forces for inter-continental conflict as contributing to their ultimate goal of achieving a dominant position over the West, particularly the United States.  
--We do not believe however, that the Soviets presently count on a combination of action by the USSR and lack of action by the US that would give them, within the next ten years, the capability to devastate the US while preventing devastation to the USSR.

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--Nevertheless, they are striving to achieve war-fighting and war-survival capabilities that would leave the USSR in a better position than the US if war occurred.

--They also aim for intercontinental forces that have visible and, therefore, politically useful advantages over the US.

--The Soviets probably hope that their strategic capabilities will give them more latitude to pursue foreign policy objectives and at the same time discourage the US and others from using or threatening to use force to influence Soviet actions.

18. Within the Intelligence Community, however, there is considerable disagreement with the summary of Soviet strategic objectives and expectations which I have just outlined.

a. The intelligence chief of the Department of State believes that the Soviets have more modest expectations for their strategic programs.

--He believes the Soviets do not expect the US to concede the USSR any meaningful strategic advantage, and do not expect to achieve in the foreseeable future what could reasonably be called a war-winning or war-survival posture.

--During the next ten years, the Soviets will undertake vigorous strategic force improvements with a view to achieving advantages where possible, but above all to avoid falling behind the US.

--State concludes that it is unlikely the Soviet leaders anticipate any relative strategic gains during the next ten years which would substantially influence their inclination for risk taking.

- b. The Defense Intelligence Agency and the intelligence chiefs of the US military services believe that the Soviets do, in fact, think they can attain the capability to wage an intercontinental nuclear war and to survive it with sufficient resources to dominate the postwar period.

--According to this view, the Soviets' programs for improving their forces, their extensive research on advanced weapons technology, and their resource allocation are in keeping with that objective. They are integral to a programmed Soviet effort to achieve the ultimate goal of a dominant position in the world.

--This view holds that the Soviets expect to move closer to this goal within the next

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ten years and, as a result, expect to be able increasingly to deter US initiatives and to inhibit US opposition to Soviet initiatives.

- c. In addition, the then intelligence chief of the US Air Force stated his belief that Soviet programs are already placing the US at a serious strategic disadvantage.

--He believes that the Soviets are exploiting for their own strategic advantage the SALT negotiations, detente, and economic and arms control diplomacy.

--He believes that the Estimate understates Soviet capabilities and the Soviet drive for strategic superiority, and is an inadequate basis for US SALT, national defense, and foreign security policies.

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## BACKGROUND PAPER

### OVERALL SOVIET OBJECTIVES

1. This year, in addition to NIE 11-3/8, we have done a separate estimate, NIE 11-4, on the broader question of long-range Soviet national goals. It seeks to relate these overall goals to trends and objectives in military programs.
2. In particular, we considered two closely related questions:
  - a. Do the Soviet leaders now base policy on a belief that the USSR will advance toward overall dominance in the world? Do they now expect to achieve such a position in the next ten years?
  - b. Have they come to believe -- or will they soon -- that aggressive actions on their part carry lower risks than earlier, low enough to be acceptable?
3. We agree on some matters and disagree on others. Among the areas of agreement:
  - a. The Soviet leaders' basic perception of the world still posits a struggle of two great systems, in which theirs will ultimately prevail. Neither in its foreign policy nor its military policy does the USSR aim at long-term equilibrium between the two systems.

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- b. The Soviets see military power as a key instrument for attaining strategic objectives without war. The Soviets have never accepted the concept of mutual assured destruction, with its connotation that some finite level of force is sufficient for deterrence. They do, however, recognize mutual deterrence as a present reality that will be very difficult to alter.
- c. They are little disposed to adjust their military programs unilaterally so as to foster strategic stability, or to moderate them lest they provoke US program reactions. The striking thing about Soviet military programs is not that they have accelerated in the last few years, but that they have persisted at a vigorous and more or less steady pace for two decades. Neither the creation of an acknowledged deterrent nor the achievement of acknowledged strategic parity has caused this effort to falter. We expect it to continue.
- d. At the same time, the Soviets worry that they may fall behind in the qualitative military competition, and this further reinforces the priority of their research and development effort.
- e. They are conscious of their weaknesses, particularly those arising from economic and technological deficiencies and conflict with China. They do not presently

expect to remove these weaknesses in the next decade.

f. On the other hand, beyond their obvious military strength, they credit themselves with other important assets: disciplined policy-making, social cohesion, and perseverance.

4. Disagreements within the Intelligence Community on the matter of objectives for strategic military forces has been described above. Another major area of divergence is Moscow's view of its Western competitors.

a. On this point, some in the Intelligence Community judge that the Soviets are persuaded that the US and the West are in a long-term decline that will be reflected in a flagging of political resolve, military efforts, and economic growth.

b. Others think the Soviets hope for this but do not count on it, and indeed may think that US and Western military efforts are again on the rise.

5. The conclusions of NIE 11-4 are sorted out into two main lines of analysis:

a. One line of argument holds that, in the Soviet view, the US and its allies have entered upon a new stage in the "general crisis of capitalism" that will prove irreversible even if there are periodic recoveries.  
--The problems of the Soviet economy and the dispute with China are serious but not debilitating.

--According to this analysis, the Soviets aim to achieve the degree of military superiority over West needed to permit them to wage, survive as a national entity, and win a conventional or nuclear war.

--While it is uncertain when the Soviets expect to gain such a decisive strategic superiority, they expect to move closer to it over the next ten years.

--This trend, they believe, will increasingly enable them to deter US initiatives and to inhibit US opposition to Soviet initiatives, thereby advancing them toward overall dominance in the world.

b. The second line of argument holds that, in Soviet thinking, the question is much more open.

--This analysis too perceives an increased Soviet confidence. But it holds that the Soviet leaders give greater weight to the handicaps of the USSR's economic and technological weaknesses and its conflict with China.

--It believes that they attribute greater resilience to the capitalist economies and anticipate continued Western support for defense efforts.

--In this view, the USSR's military efforts are bent on keeping pace with its adversaries as well as seeking margins of advantage. But Moscow does not

have a realistic expectation of achieving a war-winning capability, particularly in the next decade.

--Expecting Soviet foreign policy to be assertive, this analysis nonetheless holds that Moscow does not now expect a series of advances that, by the mid-1980s, will cumulate into a finally decisive shift.

--In short, this analysis attributes to the Soviets not a programmatic design for military superiority but a patient approach to continuing tough competition together with a dedication to high and steady levels of effort in the elements of power.

6. These differences of judgment, and others on lesser matters appearing in the estimate, should not be allowed to obscure the large areas of agreement about Soviet objectives. In particular, the Community agrees that, whatever the USSR's long-run views, Soviet risk-taking abroad in any specific situation will continue to be governed by Moscow's perception of interests and power at the particular time and place.



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### THE EXPERIMENT IN COMPETITIVE ANALYSIS

1. Last spring, at the strong recommendation of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, the DCI agreed to conduct an analytical experiment in conjunction with producing this year's NIE 11-3/8.
  - A. The method was to invite experts from outside the Intelligence Community to examine the same data available to the community and to write independent reports on several key topics addressed in the Estimate.
  - B. The purpose was to test the hypothesis that, within the range of uncertainty allowed by the data, a professionally responsible case could be made that the Soviet threat was more serious than that perceived by the drafters of the estimates.
  - C. The experiment grew out of PFIAB's concerns that the Intelligence Community was underestimating the Soviet threat.
  - D. Topics suggested by PFIAB and accepted by the DCI were Soviet ICBM accuracy, Soviet air defense capabilities to prevent low-altitude penetration, and Soviet strategic objectives.

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2. There was never any doubt that the outside experts -- termed the "B" Teams -- would prepare somber interpretations on their assigned topics.
  - A. Their membership (selected by the DCI in consultation with the PFIAB) comprised experts whose past views were known to have coincided with the hypothesis being examined.
  - B. The experiment was not designed to be balanced; for example, it did not include "C" teams who would examine the possibility of more benign interpretations of the data.
  - C. The question at issue was how good a case could the outside experts make for their point of view if they had available the same data as the community estimators.
  - D. It should be noted that the "B" team interpretations were not intended to be, and did not become, a part of the National Estimate. Rather, the results of the experiment were eventually intended to be evaluated by the PFIAB and the NSC staff prior to any decision about further dissemination.
3. During the summer and fall, the "B" teams prepared their reports and there were exchanges of drafts and discussion between them and the Intelligence Community experts -- the so-called "A" teams.

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A. There were several identifiable influences on the Estimate:

1. The discipline of having to confront alternative views caused the analytic groups preparing the Estimate to seek particularly carefully to document their conclusions, to be precise in their terminology -- especially about Soviet doctrine -- and to avoid generalizations about the future which were not firmly grounded in defensible intelligence analysis.
2. More caution was introduced into estimates about the period five to ten years hence, especially about the future capabilities of Soviet defenses to limit penetration and damage. This caution arose in part from gaps in the evidence about the future effectiveness of Soviet air defenses and civil defense programs. Benefit was also derived from "B" team argumentation that conclusions were sensitive to operational factors and Red-Blue interactions which require detailed net assessment.
4. The "B" team on Soviet objectives -- the one led by Dr. Pipes and the one which has been the subject of shrill reports in the press -- concluded that all the evidence points to an undeviating and operative Soviet grand strategy

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of achieving global hegemony, based on a combination of military and nonmilitary instrumentalities.

- A. To support this aim, the Soviets strive for effective superiority in all types of military capabilities.
  - B. In strategic nuclear forces, they place a high priority on achieving a war-fighting and war-winning capability, in the sense of assuring substantial Soviet predominance following a nuclear war, and the Soviets may feel that this is within their grasp.
  - C. If such a capability is not attainable, they intend to secure so substantial a nuclear war-fighting advantage that they would be less deterred than the US from initiating the use of nuclear weapons.
  - D. Finally, the "B" team believes that within the 10-year period of the NIE, the Soviets may well expect to achieve a degree of military superiority that would support a dramatically more aggressive pursuit of their objectives, including direct military challenges to vital Western interests.
5. As indicated in the summary of Soviet strategic forces, there is concern in the Intelligence Community about the trends in Soviet strategic programs, which in and of themselves raise a legitimate question about whether the Soviets are pushing for strategic superiority.

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- A. But the position of the DCI in the NIE places more stress than the "B" team on the very real problems the Soviets confront, the uncertainties and contingencies they face, their high respect for US capabilities, and their concerns about current US programs.
  - B. Thus the DCI position in the NIE is that there is a wider gap than the "B" team believes between current Soviet expectations and the objectives we all agree the Soviets ultimately seek.
  - C. The DCI's estimate of Soviet objectives and expectations in this year's NIE is not substantially different than that of his predecessor in last year's NIE, contrary to some press accounts. There has been no 180° switch representing some victory of a "B" team over a reluctant but finally overwhelmed group of analysts and estimators.
6. It is true, however, that over the past several years the successive NIEs have presented an increasingly stark picture of Soviet intentions and capabilities as our evidence and analysis of the scope, vigor, and persistence of Soviet strategic offensive and defensive programs has accumulated.
- A. This took place in previous years without any "B" team challenge and in fact would have taken place this year had there been none.

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- B. The evidence of Soviet programs governs our analysis, not politically motivated opinions.
- 7. The irresponsible and pejorative publicity about this experiment makes it difficult to evaluate the effort objectively.
  - A. While the source of these stories has not been discovered, they seem clearly aimed at politicizing what the PFIAB and the DCI intended as a responsible use of outside specialists for a professional methodological experiment.
  - B. The Pipes team's sweeping -- and exaggerated -- critique of estimates and estimative methodology on Soviet capabilities and objectives lent itself to press leaks designed to discredit the estimating process and the CIA.
- 8. Despite the din and clamor in the press, the work of both the several "A" and "B" teams was done seriously and professional, honest differences of view about issues of importance to US security have been expressed without any attempt to paper them over, and the integrity of the NIE and the Intelligence Community were not compromised in the process.

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Approved For Release 2005/12/14 : CIA-RDP84R01033R000100170002-3

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